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ABSTRACT
Economic theory predicts that an unexpected wealth windfall should increase consumption shortly
after the windfall is received. We test this prediction using administrative records on over 40,000
401(k) accounts. Contrary to theory, we estimate a negative short-run marginal propensity to
consume out of idiosyncratic 401(k) capital gains shocks. These results cannot be interpreted as
standard intertemporal substitution, since the idiosyncratic returns that we study do not predict future
returns. Instead, our findings imply that many investors are influenced by a positive feedback effect,
through which higher recent returns encourage higher short-run saving. Like any other animal,
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Economic theory predicts that an unexpected wealth windfall should immediately and 
permanently  increase consumption, which is an income effect. For example, in an infinite-
horizon model with complete markets, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of a 
windfall roughly equals the discount rate.
1 If markets are not complete, economic theory predicts 
that the MPC may considerably exceed the discount rate (Carroll 1992, 1997). 
In this paper, we present empirical evidence that contradicts these predictions.  We find 
that the short-run MPC with respect to 401(k) capital gain windfalls is negative.  At year-end 
2001, 401(k) accounts contained $1.75 trillion owned by 45 million workers (Holden and 
Vanderhei 2003). Using administrative data on 40,000 401(k) accounts, we calculate 
idiosyncratic capital gains in the cross-section that do not forecast future returns. Standard theory 
predicts that a cross-sectional regression of consumption growth on these orthogonal capital 
gains shocks will identify only a positive income effect, since the standard substitution effect 
should be inoperative. Contrary to theory, we estimate a negative short-run MPC.  These results 
are robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications motivated by theory and by the special 
institutional features of 401(k) plans. 
At first glance, this result appears to be quite perverse. However, our results represent a 
natural extension of an old idea: investors chase returns. Several authors have shown that return-
chasing influences asset allocation (e.g., Patel, Hendricks and Zeckhauser 1994, Benartzi 2001, 
Goetzmann and Massa 2002, Huberman and Sengmuller 2004). We are the first to show that 
return-chasing also plays a role in consumption decisions.
2 High transitory past investment 
returns encourage naïve households to invest more in the short run and therefore consume less.  
Although the main thrust of our paper is empirical, we also show that combining 
reinforcement learning with the standard economic model can reconcile our results with the 
positive MPC estimates found in prior consumption studies. Reinforcement learning models have 
                                                 
1 In a continuous-time model with isoelastic preferences the MPC is given by (1-θ)[r + (θπ²)/(2σ²)] + θρ, where θ is 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, r is the risk free real interest rate, π is the equity premium, σ is the 
standard deviation of stock returns, and ρ is the discount rate. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is one 
(log utility), this formula collapses to the discount rate. 
2 The first suggestions of such an effect can be found in work by Starr-McCluer (2002), who analyzes household 
surveys in which 11.6% of stockholders report that the 1990s bull market caused them to save more, while only 
3.4% say they saved less. Our identification strategy differs from that of Starr-McCluer, since we identify wealth 
shocks cross-sectionally. 
 3 
had success in predicting subject choices in experiments (Roth and Erev 1995, Erev and Roth 
1998, Charness and Levin 2005). In our context, reinforcement learning encourages saving in 
response to high returns and discourages saving in response to low returns. Even though the 
standard income effect is operative, it is more than offset by the reinforcement effect in this 
particular case, yielding a negative MPC. 
Section 2 describes our data set, which is comprised of detailed information for 
approximately 40,000 participants in five company-sponsored 401(k) plans. While ours is the 
first study to use these specific records, other papers have exploited different sets of individual-
level 401(k) data to study savings rates (Huberman et al., 2004), asset allocation (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 2001, Agnew et al, 2003, Huberman and Jiang, 2006), trading (Choi et al., 2002, Agnew 
et al, 2003), and investment in employer stock (Huberman and Sengmuller, 2004, Choi et al., 
2004). Section 3 lays out our empirical methodology and explains our methods for measuring 
wealth shocks. Section 4 presents our main results and reconciles them with the previous 
literature. Section 5 considers objections to our results, most of which fall into two categories. 
The first is that people adjust their consumption along margins that our consumption measure 
does not capture. The second is that our results are driven by wealth shocks outside of the 401(k) 
that we do not observe. We find no evidence to support these objections. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data description 
  Our data come from a large benefits administration and consulting firm. We have panel 
data for five companies that start when our data provider became the plan administrator at each 
firm and end at year-end 2000. These data contain the date, amount, and type of every 
transaction made in the 401(k) plans by every participant. In addition, we have cross-sectional 
snapshots of age, annual salary, date of hire, gender, marital status, 401(k) asset allocations, and 
401(k) contribution rates in effect on the last pay period
3 of 1998, 1999, and 2000 for those 
actively employed at the companies on those dates. 
Table 1 gives summary statistics as of year-end 2000 for our companies, which we code-
name Company A through E. Our sample consists of large firms that span a wide range of 
industries. The employees are on average 42.9 years old and earn $55,292 a year. By 
comparison, the March 2001 Current Population Survey reports an average age of 40.8 years and 
                                                 
3 The pay period is typically two weeks in our sample. 4 
average salary of $45,656 among full-time workers in companies employing over 1,000 workers 
and offering some kind of retirement plan. The average 401(k) participation rate across the firms 
is 79%, which is close to the 2000 national participation rate of 80% found by the Profit 
Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001), and the average balance of participants is $65,964, 
which is similar to Holden and Vanderhei’s (2001) reported average year-end 2000 balance of 
$61,207 among plans with more than 10,000 participants. 
  All of our companies offer matching contributions ranging from 25 cents to a full dollar 
for each dollar contributed to the 401(k) by the employee up to a threshold, although Company C 
did not introduce its match until 2000. All of the plans allow participants to take hardship 
withdrawals from and loans against their 401(k) plan balances, and two allow non-hardship 
withdrawals from current contributions. These provisions make 401(k) savings in the companies 
we study more liquid than for the 401(k) participant population at large.
4 Finally, all of the plans 
allow changes to the elected contribution rate and asset allocation on a daily basis. Changes can 
be made by talking to a benefits center representative on the phone during business hours, or by 
using a touch-tone phone system or the Internet 24 hours a day. The direct transaction costs 
involved in changing one’s savings rate in these plans are therefore minimal. 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
Our empirical objective is to estimate the relationship between consumption growth and 
wealth shocks orthogonal to innovations in expected (under the rational probability measure) 
returns. The key assumption in our analysis is that consumption adjustments are observable 
through changes in the 401(k) contribution rate. This assumption is plausible: most households 
should be doing nearly all of their saving in the 401(k) because the employer match (for the 
plans in our data) and tax benefits make the 401(k) plan the most attractive savings vehicle 
available. Consistent with this normative view, among 401(k)-holding households earning 
between $20,000 and $70,000 a year in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances—a sample 
roughly comparable to the one we will use in our analysis—the median household has less than 
                                                 
4 The U.S. Department of Labor (2003) reports that in 2000, 40% of full-time employees with savings and thrift 
plans in private industry were not allowed to take early in-service withdrawals for any reason, and an additional 29% 
could only take hardship withdrawals. The Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001) reports that 14% of 
plans did not permit loans in 2000. 5 
one month’s income in net financial assets outside the 401(k).
5 It is only at the 80th percentile 
that households have one year’s income outside the 401(k), and this probably overstates outside 
asset holdings in our sample; the generosity of our 401(k) plans’ early withdrawal and loan 
provisions substantially mitigates the need for a precautionary wealth stock outside the 401(k). 
We will, however, explore the possibility that the 401(k) contribution rate is not the savings 
adjustment margin in section 5. 
Our reduced-form expression for individual i’s consumption growth from year-end t – 1 
to year-end t, normalized by income, is 
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where Ci,t is annualized consumption flow during the last pay period of year t, Yi,t–1 is annualized 
salary flow during the last pay period of year t – 1, αi is the individual’s fixed effect, Shocki,t is 
the wealth shock in dollars accrued from the beginning to the end of year t, Xi,t–1 is a vector of 
demographic variables that change non-linearly with time (age squared, log of salary in 1998 
dollars, and log of tenure at the company), Dτ are year dummies equal to 1 if t = τ, Fj are firm 
dummies equal to 1 if i works in firm j, and εi,t is the disturbance term. The coefficients of 
interest are β1 and β2. Under the approximation that a wealth shock changes consumption by a 
constant fraction of that shock each subsequent period, we can interpret β1 as the one-year 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. β2 should equal zero if consumption responds to 
wealth innovations without a lag, as is commonly assumed in theory. However, there is some 
empirical evidence that stock market return effects on consumption growth are long-lived (e.g. 
Dynan and Maki (2000), Gabaix and Laibson (2002)). 
  We transform this expression in order to make the dependent variable identifiable from 
our data. Let Si,t be i’s 401(k) savings/contribution rate during the last pay period of year t. We 
assume that 
                                                 
5 On the assets side, we include CDs, bonds, savings bonds, publicly traded stock, mutual funds, cash value life 
insurance, other managed accounts, transactions accounts, non-401(k) pension accounts, and miscellaneous assets. 
For liabilities, we subtract credit card debt, non-home-equity lines of credit, business loans, education loans, other 
consumer loans, margin loans, loans against life insurance policies, loans against non-401(k) pension accounts, and 
car loans. 6 
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where ki is a constant that represents consumption funded by income earned outside the company 
or savings outside the 401(k). Substituting this expression into (1) and simplifying yields 
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We add the before-tax and (if the plan offers the option) after-tax 401(k) contribution 
rates in effect for the last pay period of 1998, 1999, or 2000 to calculate Si,t in each of these 
years. Note that there are at most three consumption observations per individual, which translates 
into a maximum of two consumption growth observations. Because we are allowing for an 
individual fixed effect in consumption growth, we will require that all employees in our 
regressions have two consumption growth observations. Yi,t is set to annualized salary in the last 
pay cycle of year t in January 1998 dollars, assuming that salary during a calendar year is paid in 
nominally equal amounts each pay cycle and deflating by the monthly CPI series. 
Constructing our key independent variable, the 401(k) wealth shock, is more 
complicated. Simply calculating the annual change in 401(k) balances would not generate a valid 
measure of the type of wealth shock that we are trying to identify. Much of the annual change in 
account balances is generated by payroll contributions to the plan, and these contributions should 
not be counted as wealth shocks because they are merely transfers from human wealth to 
financial wealth.
6 We could subtract annual 401(k) contributions from the change in 401(k) 
balances to isolate the change in balances that is due to capital gains (or losses). But a portion of 
these capital gains is expected and thus, in theory, should not affect consumption growth. We 
must therefore isolate the unexpected component of capital gains. With these considerations in 
mind, we define the wealth shock accrued over a year as the difference between the realized and 
expected dollar-denominated real capital gain in each asset, summed over all assets. 
We calculate capital gains in the standard manner: for each asset, we multiply monthly 
percent returns by the participant’s dollar holdings at the end of the prior month, and then add up 
across months and assets.
7 In order to compute expected capital gains, we must measure 
                                                 
6 More explicitly, human wealth can be seen as the present value of all future labor income. Each paycheck is a 
dividend that diminishes human wealth by the same amount it increases financial wealth. The employee can choose 
to consume this dividend and diminish total wealth, or save it and keep total wealth unchanged. 
7 Assets are defined at the level of individual mutual funds and employer stock holdings. Dollar holdings are 
deflated by the same monthly CPI series used to deflate income, Yt. 7 
expected percent returns. We use two different proxies. The first measure, the “adaptive expected 
return,” is motivated by empirical evidence that the typical investor’s stock market return 
expectations comove positively with recent returns (Graham and Harvey (2003), Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003), Benartzi (2001), Huberman and Sengmuller (2004), Choi et al. (2004)). We 
define the adaptive expected return as the lagged ten-year real return on an investment option’s 
asset class. Table 2 lists the eleven asset classes and the indexes used to measure their lagged 
returns. 
The “constant expected return” is the average real return on the investment option’s asset 
class from January 1926 to December 1997. This measure of expected return does not change 
with asset return realizations during 1998 and 2000. We consider this to be the rational expected 
return, motivated by the evidence of Goyal and Welch (2006) that the historical average equity 
premium is the best out-of-sample predictor of future equity returns. We use the same indices to 
compute the constant expected returns and the adaptive expected returns, except that the constant 
expected returns use the S&P 500 historical return to form the employer stock expected return 
rather than the employer stock’s historical return because the latter contains a large idiosyncratic 
component and does not exist all the way back to 1926.
8 
To illustrate how our wealth shocks are calculated, suppose that there are only two funds 
available to investors. Fund A’s expected return is 1% this month, and Fund B’s expected return 
is 2%. Fund A actually returns 3%, and Fund B actually returns –3%. Investor 1 had $3,000 in 
Fund A and $1,000 in Fund B at the end of the prior month; Investor 2 had $1,000 in Fund A and 
$1,000 in Fund B. Then Investor 1 receives a $3,000 × (3 – 1)% + $1,000 × (–3 – 2)% = $10 
wealth shock this month, while Investor 2 receives a $1,000 × (3 – 1)% + $1,000 × (–3 – 2)% =  
–$30 wealth shock this month. We sum monthly wealth shocks to form the annual wealth shock 
for each investor. 
We take two econometric approaches to estimating equation (4), both of which rely upon 
differences in differences. First, we use a least-squares dummy variable estimator, which does 
not take into account the fact that 401(k) contribution rates cannot be negative or exceed the 
plan-imposed maximum. Second, we use the semiparametric Honoré (1992) estimator, which 
allows for individual fixed effects while correcting for censored observations. The fact that our 
                                                 
8 We use the S&P 500 for the international and emerging market return indices before January 1988 because the 
MSCI indices were not calculated before then. 8 
data are censored at both the left and the right necessitates the use of the least absolute deviations 
version of Honoré’s estimator.
9 If Si,t is the plan’s maximum contribution rate or Si,t–1 is zero, the 
observation is considered left-censored; if Si,t is zero or Si,t–1 is the maximum contribution rate, 
the observation is considered right-censored. Following Chay and Honoré (1998), we bootstrap 
the standard errors by drawing 1,000 samples of 1,000 individuals’ consumption growth pairs 
with replacement from the data and computing the estimator for each sample. The standard error 
for an estimated coefficient  ˆ
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where N is the total consumption growth observations in the real data and  ˆb
j β  is the bth bootstrap 
estimate. 
Variation in our wealth shocks comes from variation in unexpected fund returns and the 
dollar amounts individuals invested in each asset. Because of the individual fixed effects in our 
econometric specification, our identifying variation is cross-sectional variation in the difference 
between an individual’s 1999 wealth shock and 2000 wealth shock. Cross-sectional variation in 
the size of the wealth shocks individuals experienced in those years normatively should not have 
induced cross-sectional variation in their beliefs about expected returns. In the previous example, 
a rational Investor 1 would make no inference about future returns from the fact that his wealth 
shock is $40 higher than Investor 2’s wealth shock. Therefore, differences between the two 
investors’ contemporaneous consumption responses should arise solely from income effects if 
investors are rational.
10 
Our sample is limited to workers who have been actively employed at a sample firm and 
continuously enrolled in the 401(k) plan from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000. We 
include employees whose contribution rate or plan balances are zero, provided that they had 
positive balances at some time in the past. We also require that individuals have salaries greater 
than $20,000 in 1998 because a large fraction of those with salaries under $20,000 are part-time 
                                                 
9 The least squared deviation version of the two-sided Honoré estimator does not necessarily have a unique solution. 
10 Alternatively, heterogeneous preferences can cause the strength of the substitution effect to vary across 
individuals, so that contemporaneous substitution responses to the same aggregate return news covary negatively 
enough with the income effect to generate our empirical result. Although such utility functions could probably be 
constructed, we doubt that the range of preference variation required to replicate our empirical results would be 
economically reasonable.  9 
employees.
11 In addition, we trim workers who have a one-year income growth observation 
above 30% or below –20%, which roughly corresponds to removing the top 2% and bottom 2% 
of the income growth distribution. These deleted outliers are likely caused by transitions between 
part-time and full-time work status. 
Finally, we drop individuals if their salary is high enough in 1998 that they could exceed 
the $10,000 annual limit on before-tax 401(k) contributions by contributing at the plan’s 
maximum before-tax contribution rate. The reason we impose this selection rule can be 
illustrated by the following example. Suppose a highly-paid employee contributes enough that he 
hits the before-tax dollar limit midway through the year. If his company only allows before-tax 
contributions (Companies B, C, and E), then his 401(k) contribution rate is frozen at 0 for the 
remainder of the year and does not reflect any changes in his consumption rate. If the company 
allows additional after-tax contributions to the 401(k) (Companies A and D) or before-tax 
contributions to a non-401(k) deferred compensation plan (Company A), consumption changes 
may still not be reflected in the contribution rate because these alternative savings vehicles are 
not as attractive and therefore may not attract the marginal savings dollar.
12 
These selection criteria leave us with 54,054 observations on 27,027 employees. 
 
4. Main results 
4.1. Regression estimates 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for our consumption growth and normalized wealth 
shock measures. Normalized consumption growth has a median of 1.4% of income, exhibits 
slight positive serial correlation, and is right-skewed. Both normalized wealth shock measures 
have a median close to zero and a relatively narrow distribution. The 10th percentile of the 
normalized adaptive wealth shock is a loss of 39.4% of a year’s income, and the 90th percentile 
is a gain of 22.7% of a year’s income. The distribution is similar for the normalized constant 
returns wealth shock; the 10th percentile is a loss of 31.9% of a year’s income and the 90th 
                                                 
11 In the March 2001 Current Population Survey, 29.9% of workers who earned less than $20,000 a year worked less 
than 35 hours a week or fewer than 40 weeks per year. Only 5.6% of workers earning between $20,000 and $30,000 
a year satisfied this definition of part-time work. 
12 If an employer declares bankruptcy, employees in the deferred compensation plan can lose their entire deferred 
compensation balance. We eliminate participants in Company A’s deferred compensation plan from our sample. 10 
percentile is a gain of 25.9% of a year’s income.
13 Both normalized wealth shocks are ex post 
negatively serially correlated. This serial correlation is sample-specific and arises from the 
persistence of individual asset allocations and the fact that the stock market did well in the first 
half of our sample and poorly in the second half. It should not be interpreted as evidence that 
current wealth shocks are informative about future wealth shocks.
14 
  Table 4 presents the coefficients from estimating equation (3). The first row shows that 
all four MPC estimates are negative and statistically significant. The point estimates range from 
–0.44% to –1.79%, which means that a positive wealth shock equal to one year of income will 
contemporaneously decrease annualized consumption flow by 0.44% to 1.79% of yearly income. 
In addition, there appears to be a significant lagged consumption response as well. In the year 
following a positive wealth shock of one year’s income, annualized consumption flow drops by 
0.55% to 2.10% of yearly income. 
 The  certainty-equivalence permanent income hypothesis predicts that the MPC is higher 
(more positive) for the old than the young, since the young have a longer remaining lifespan over 
which to spread consumption of a windfall. This motivates our estimating separate MPCs for 
those who are under 30 years old, between 30 and 39, between 40 and 49, between 50 and 59, 
and 60 or above, while constraining the other regression coefficients to be equal across age 
groups. The results are in Table 5, where we have omitted coefficient estimates for the non-
shock variables. 
We find that the MPC does increase almost monotonically with age, but even the oldest 
workers do not exhibit a positive MPC. For example, the first column of Table 5 reports the 
results for a least-squares dummy variable regression using the adaptive wealth shock as the 
wealth shock variable. Our contemporaneous MPC estimate is –9.49% for employees under 30 
and –0.50% for employees over 60. The lagged MPC also shows a nearly monotonically 
increasing pattern, from –11.77% for employees under 30 to –0.44% for employees over 60. 
These patterns are qualitatively robust across estimators and wealth shock definitions. 
Overall, there is no compelling evidence that anomalous MPCs are restricted to a 
particular subset of the population. If our results simply reflected reallocation between outside 
                                                 
13 The extremes of the wealth shock distributions come from middle-income individuals close to retirement who had 
large 401(k) balances. 11 
assets and the 401(k), or if outside wealth shocks were contaminating our estimates, then we 
would expect to find positive MPC estimates among the young, who are the least likely to own 
non-401(k) assets. Instead, the young have the most negative MPCs. If negative MPCs were 
simply a pathology of inexperienced investors that eventually disappears, we would expect to see 
positive MPC estimates among the old. But in our data, even the oldest employees have negative 
MPCs. 
In the long run, consumption and wealth are tied together by the budget constraint. If in 
the short run, 401(k) investors’ consumption growth comoves negatively with wealth shocks, 
when does consumption catch up to wealth? A plausible answer is that consumption moves 
towards wealth in retirement, either through a higher consumption rate during retirement or an 
earlier retirement date. Table 5 presents weak evidence that the latter is happening. We take 
employees who were at least 60 years old at year-end 1999 and estimate a probit on the 
probability that these employees left the company in 2000. (Overall, 50.4% of this population 
left in 2000.) The dependent variables are normalized wealth shock in 1999 and 1998, company 
dummies, and age, log of salary, and log of tenure at year-end 1999. We estimate positive effects 
for all the shock variables, and the effects are economically large; a positive wealth shock in year 
t equal to one year’s income increases the probability of retirement by over 2 percentage points 
in year t and over 11 percentage points in year t + 1. However, none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. 
These retirement results are not inconsistent with the existing literature on the 
relationship between wealth shocks and retirement, which has come to conflicting conclusions. 
(See Hurd and Boskin (1984), Burtless (1984), Krueger and Pischke (1992), Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian and Rosen (1993), and Imbens et al. (2001).) 
 
4.2. Interpretation and Reconciliation with Past MPC Estimates 
Our estimates stand in sharp contrast to past empirical research that has found positive 
MPCs out of cash windfalls and aggregate stock market movements. We square our results with 
these previous findings by interpreting negative MPCs as the consequence of reinforcement 
learning working in opposition to the standard income effect. Roth and Erev (1995) identify two 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 If participants who held large amounts of equity in the first half of the sample and hence had high measured 
wealth shocks foresaw that equity returns would be low in the second half of the sample, they could have easily 12 
key features of reinforcement learning models. The first is the Law of Effect: agents are more 
likely to repeat actions that have yielded favorable outcomes in the past. The second is the Power 
Law of Practice: learning curves are steep initially and then level out as the stock of 
reinforcement increases.  
Reinforcement learning reconciles all of the evidence on MPCs: 
•  The Law of Effect predicts that if a consumer experiences a gratifyingly high return 
from her savings activity, she will allocate more resources to savings and less to 
consumption. This behavior is a generalization of the phenomenon commonly 
referred to as returns-chasing, where investors reallocate money to assets that have 
recently experienced high returns while holding total savings fixed. The Law of 
Effect is offset by the income effect, which pushes the investor to cut her savings. In 
our data, the reinforcement effect appears to dominate the income effect, causing the 
MPC to be negative even though variation in the returns from which the MPC is 
identified conveys no information about future returns. 
•  The Power Law of Practice is consistent with our finding that the young—whose 
stock of past reinforcements is the smallest—have the most negative MPCs, since 
they are the most swayed by the Law of Effect and have the smallest income effect. 
•  When financial investment does not causally precede windfalls, there is no 
reinforcement to invest more and only the income effect is operative. Hence, the 
MPC out of war veteran payments and Holocaust reparations range from 17% to 97% 
(Bodkin 1959, Kreinin 1961, Landsberger 1966). 
•  The income effect increases proportionally with the size of the windfall, whereas the 
reinforcement effect levels off due to the Power Law of Practice. Therefore, the MPC 
out of large lottery prizes (Imbens et al. 2001) is 86%.
15 
•  Reinforcement learning—and hence negative MPCs—should be less prevalent among 
agents who are more sophisticated than the 401(k) investors in our sample. We also 
expect that the sophisticated are, on average, richer than the unsophisticated. 
Therefore, aggregate consumption growth comoves positively with aggregate stock 
market movements because sophisticates do most of the consuming in the economy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
traded out of equities and thus avoided the negative serial correlation in wealth shock. 13 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Starr-McCluer (2002) finds that households with 
more than $250,000 in stockholdings were much more likely than poorer stockholders 
to report that the 1990s bull market caused them to decrease their saving or increase 
their spending. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
  In this section, we further consider possible objections to our results. Subsection 5.1 
examines whether the consumption responses we estimate reflect active choices made by 
employees. Subsections 5.2 through 5.5 test the possibility that the 401(k) contribution rate is not 
the relevant consumption adjustment margin for the people in our data. Subsection 5.6 discusses 
and tests the effect of non-401(k) wealth shocks on our results. We find no evidence that 
weakens the force of our main result. Of the 30 MPC estimates presented in this section, all are 
negative, and 26 of these are statistically significant. 
 
5.1. Negative consumption responses do not reflect active savings choices 
  The passivity of 401(k) investors has been extensively documented (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988), Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi et al. (2002, 2004)). Therefore, the 
consumption “responses” we estimate may be due to a coincidental in-sample relationship 
between employee income growth and capital gains, rather than the result of active savings 
choices. 
To address this concern, we estimate the main regression setting the income adjustment 
term in the dependent variable to zero, so that we are only measuring active contribution rate 
changes, St–1 – St. The results are in the first row of Table 7. Because contribution rate changes 
are constrained to integer percentages of income (that is, they can be no smaller than 1 percent of 
income), the median contribution rate change is zero for almost all subsamples of the data. 
Therefore, the Honoré estimator is not meaningful in this context, since it is a median estimator, 
but we report its coefficients for completeness. 
For both definitions of wealth shock, the least-squares estimate indicates that a positive 
wealth shock of one year’s income causes the average employee to actively decrease his 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Kearney and Liao (2004) do not find evidence of a negative same-day MPC out of small lottery prizes. However, 
they do not measure the effect of prizes on lottery purchases on subsequent days. 14 
contribution rate by 0.27% to 0.29% of income. These coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The lagged wealth effects are also negative and of similar magnitude, although the 
statistical significance is somewhat weaker. 
We conclude that the anomalous consumption responses in our sample are due to active 
employee choices. 
 
5.2. The 401(k) is not the relevant margin for consumption adjustment 
  Our MPC estimate hinges on the assumption that the 401(k) contribution rate is the 
margin at which participants adjust their savings rate. If participants find it worthwhile to adjust 
savings through contributions to other asset accounts, then the 401(k) contribution rate response 
to retirement wealth shocks may be offset by activity elsewhere. 
  We test this alternative explanation by restricting our sample to participants who at year-
end 1998 were contributing less than the threshold to which their employer would provide 
matching contributions. These participants face instantaneous risk-free marginal returns to 
saving in their 401(k) of 25% to 100%. It is difficult to imagine that there are alternative 
investment vehicles that offer comparable risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, these employees have 
especially strong incentives to adjust their consumption expenditures exclusively through their 
401(k) contribution rate.
16 Because Company C did not have a match until 2000, its participants 
are excluded from this analysis. 
The results of this regression are found in the second row of Table 7. The least-squares 
estimates of the contemporaneous MPC remain statistically significant, and their magnitudes 
increase slightly to –1.95% and –1.89%. The Honoré estimates are negative, but their 
magnitudes are about half those of the baseline regressions and statistically insignificant. 
However, the standard errors are over five times as large as the baseline regressions’, due in 
large part to our retaining only 16% of our baseline observations, a disproportionate number of 
which are censored. If our standard errors had remained what they were in the baseline 
regressions, the Honoré MPC estimates for those interior to the match would be strongly 
statistically significant. In contrast, the evidence for a lagged MPC effect is weaker for this 
                                                 
16 One might be concerned that the bulk of the participants who are contributing less than the match threshold are 
new employees whose employer matches will not vest for a long time. If such employees have a high probability of 
leaving the firm before their vesting begins, this restricted sample would not face significantly higher marginal 15 
subsample. The lagged least squares estimates are considerably attenuated and statistically 
insignificant, and the Honoré point estimates are nearly zero. 
  Participants may also respond to positive wealth shocks by purchasing a home. Because 
mortgage payments cover both the rental flow of housing services and the purchase of home 
equity, the home becomes a savings vehicle. The amount of money that goes towards home 
equity could come out of the 401(k) contribution rate, thus creating a spurious negative MPC 
estimate. In order to check for this possibility, we restrict our sample to those whose zip code 
didn’t change between year-end 1998 and year-end 2000. The results in the third row of Table 7 
show that all eight MPC estimates are negative and statistically significant, with little coefficient 
attenuation. 
 
5.3. Consumption adjustment is occurring through spouse’s 401(k) 
  401(k) accounts may be the most attractive savings vehicles available to the employees in 
our data, but the 401(k) accounts we see in our data may not be the only ones available to them. 
The employee’s spouse’s 401(k) may be more attractive and hence the one that attracts the 
marginal dollar. Alternatively, the consumption changes we measure may only reflect reshuffling 
of assets between the two 401(k) accounts. We test this story by restricting the sample to 
participants who were unmarried at year-end 1998. Because we do not have marital status data 
on employees at Company D, they are excluded from this analysis. The regression results are 
presented in the fourth row of Table 7. We find that our MPC point estimates become more 
negative, and all are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
5.4. Consumption adjustment is occurring through in-service withdrawals 
  We have been identifying changes in consumption through changes in the contribution 
rate and salary. However, participants may be making their consumption expenditure 
adjustments through in-service withdrawals from their 401(k) instead. In practice, this is unlikely 
to be a significant factor, given that only 5% of our sample made any in-service withdrawals 
from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2000. The main complication with a withdrawals 
analysis is the difficulty of assigning a time period to the consumption stream. At one extreme, 
                                                                                                                                                             
incentives to save in the 401(k). However, it turns out that only 9% of those in the restricted sample are not vested at 
all at year-end 1998, while 79% are fully vested and 12% are partially vested. 16 
one can assume that withdrawals are rolled over into another tax-deferred account and not 
consumed until the future, in which case withdrawals don’t matter at all for our analysis. At the 
other extreme, one can assume that the entire withdrawal is consumed immediately. An 
intermediate case is to assume that the withdrawal is annuitized and consumed slowly over time. 
  We estimate regressions with two different assumptions about the timing of withdrawal 
consumption. Because withdrawals are infrequent events, we do not use a two-week measure of 
consumption as we did in the main analysis. Instead, we use yearly consumption, defined as the 
year’s total income plus withdrawals consumed minus 401(k) contributions. We assume either 
that all withdrawals net of rollovers into other accounts are consumed in the year of the 
withdrawal, or that 5% of a withdrawal net of rollovers is consumed each year starting in the 
year of the withdrawal.
17 Withdrawals before age 59½ are assessed a 10% early withdrawal 
penalty. The dependent variable in our regressions is the year-over-year change in consumption 
normalized by prior year salary. The explanatory variables remain the same as in the previous 
regressions, as do the income, income growth, and plan enrollment restrictions. 
In the Honoré regressions, we consider an observation left-censored if in year   
t, in-service withdrawals net of rollovers equals zero and the individual contributed the 
maximum allowable given his or her salary and plan contribution rate limits. In other words, the 
individual could not have saved any more in the 401(k) plan during the year. Conversely, an 
observation is considered right-censored if the above criteria are satisfied for year t – 1. An 
observation is also considered right-censored if total balances in the plan at the end of year t plus 
rollovers in year t equals zero. That is, the individual could not have funded any more 
consumption from the 401(k). If these conditions are satisfied in the lagged year, the observation 
is considered left-censored. 
  Assuming that the entire net withdrawal is consumed in the year of the withdrawal 
generates implausibly large outliers in consumption growth. These are caused by large 
withdrawals that were not directly rolled over into another asset account by the 401(k) 
administrator. It is unlikely that such large sums were entirely consumed in one year. Therefore, 
we trim the top 1% and bottom 1% of measured consumption growth, which corresponds to 
                                                 
17 Our rollover measure is not comprehensive, however. We observe a withdrawal being rolled over into an IRA 
only when the employee asks that a check be sent directly from the employer to the IRA custodian. If an employee 
receives the withdrawal check him or herself and subsequently deposits some of the proceeds into an IRA, we do not 
observe this second transaction. 17 
constraining consumption growth to lie between –18.5% and 34.7%. We do not trim the 
dependent variable in the regressions that assume that the withdrawals are annuitized. 
  The fifth row of Table 7 contains the results when we assume that net withdrawals are 
consumed immediately, and the sixth row contains the results when we assume that net 
withdrawals are annuitized. All MPC estimates remain negative and statistically significant, and 
the point estimates do not change much. We conclude that accounting for in-service withdrawals 
cannot generate a positive MPC out of 401(k) wealth shocks. 
 
5.5. Consumption adjustment is occurring through 401(k) loans 
  Withdrawals are not the only way to access money from one’s 401(k) account; one can 
also take out a 401(k) loan for up to 50% of vested plan balances or $50,000, whichever is lower. 
401(k) loans are typically repaid through payroll deductions, with interest accruing to the 
individual’s own 401(k) account. The maximum term of a 401(k) loan varies with its purpose. 
Legally, a primary residence loan can have a term of up to 30 years, while a general purpose loan 
can have a term of no longer than 5 years. In practice, many companies further restrict the term 
of the loans that they offer their 401(k) participants. Early repayment is possible with no 
penalties. While many companies charge loan origination fees, none of the companies in our data 
choose to do so. Loans are common in our sample: 51% of the sample had a loan outstanding at 
some point between year-ends 1998 and 2000. 
Although a significant fraction of our population has a 401(k) loan, we do not believe that 
accounting for loans would capture significant consumption flow changes that are not already 
being measured by the contribution rate. Sundén and Surette (2000) find that only 8.5% of loans 
are used to finance non-durable consumption. 54.5% are used for durable expenditures on 
housing or cars, 21.6% are used for “bill consolidation” that is simply a reshuffling of liabilities, 
and 9.6% are used for education expenses. If durables are the most important consumption outlet 
for loans, then the consumption flow from durable purchases is approximately matched by the 
repayment schedule for the loan. If participants have only minimal liquid assets outside of their 
401(k) (why would they need a loan otherwise?) and spend the entire amount of the loan (it is 
costly to withdraw more than one plans on spending because of the foregone tax benefits), then 
these repayments must be coming from either reducing the 401(k) contribution rate and hence 
increasing measured consumption, or from reducing other consumption flows by the amount of 18 
the loan repayments, leaving total consumption unchanged. Although the coordination between 
loan repayments and consumption from the loan is unlikely to be perfect—for example, the 
purchased durable could completely depreciate in three years, while the loan is paid off over five 
years—we believe that the measurement error from disregarding loan activity is of second order. 
Moreover, the error induced by timing mismatches distorts the magnitude of MPC estimates, but 
it cannot explain why all of our MPC estimates are negative. To see this, suppose that a positive 
wealth shock induces an employee to take out a loan and purchase a durable that yields a 
constant consumption flow for three years and then ceases to exist. The loan is paid off over five 
years, and this repayment is funded by a decrease in the 401(k) contribution rate. Then in the 
year after the inception of the loan, the increase in consumption is underestimated by the change 
in the contribution rate. However, we would not measure an actual decrease in consumption 
through the contribution rate. Similar logic applies if the durable lasts for longer than the term of 
the loan; the consumption change is overestimated but does not take the wrong sign. 
 
5.6. Outside wealth shocks 
The measures of wealth shock presented above are calculated only within the 401(k), but 
theory calls for a comprehensive wealth shock measure. Most participants—particularly the 
young, for whom we estimate the most negative MPCs—do not have significant financial wealth 
outside the 401(k). For those who do have significant outside financial assets, to the extent that 
outside assets’ return shocks are uncorrelated or positively correlated with the shocks within the 
401(k), our MPC estimates will be unbiased or positively biased. This condition is satisfied if 
outside assets load positively on beta risk. 
  Even though 401(k) participants generally have few financial assets outside of their 
401(k), many of them have a significant non-financial asset—owner-occupied housing—whose 
return we do not observe. In order for housing wealth shocks to qualitatively affect our results, 
the surprise component of any real wealth innovation that occurs through housing must be 
negatively correlated with the surprise component of 401(k) wealth innovations. This seems 
unlikely to be true. 
  Nevertheless, to mitigate the possible effect of housing price changes, we conduct two 
tests. In the sixth row of Table 7, we present regression results where we have added dummy 
variables for the employee’s state of residence interacted with year dummies to the baseline 19 
specification in equation (3). This allows us to control for state-level variation in real estate price 
appreciation. In the seventh row of Table 7, we present regression results using only the one-
third of our sample which are least likely to own a home, judging by the proportion of housing 
units that are owner-occupied in their residential zip code, as measured by the 2000 U.S. 
Census.
18 
All of our MPC point estimates remain negative and significant. Including state-year 
interactions slightly attenuates the coefficients, but restricting to zip codes with low home 
ownership slightly increases the coefficients. Our ability to control for housing wealth is limited 
because of the nature of our data. However, in those tests that we are able to conduct, we find no 
evidence that would call our central result into doubt. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have presented evidence that the short-run MPC out of orthogonal 401(k) capital 
gains shocks is negative, in violation of standard theory. Moreover, the magnitudes of some of 
these negative estimates are quite large, especially for the young. Our results suggest that many 
investors are influenced by a reinforcement learning heuristic that leads high capital gains to 
encourage saving and discourage consumption, even when those capital gains are not useful for 
predicting future returns. This reinforcement learning framework reconciles our results with past 
work that has estimated positive MPCs out of cash windfalls and aggregate stock market 
movements. 
                                                 
18 The average owner-occupied housing fraction (weighted by employees living in the zip code) in the lower third of 
the sample is 61.1%, versus 74.8% for the entire sample. 20 
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Characteristic Company  A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E 
Industry Manufacturing  Healthcare  Manufacturing Utility  Electronics 
Number of employees  Over 20,000  Over 50,000  Over 20,000  Over 10,000  Over 10,000 
Average  age  44.1  42.7 44.6 43.5 39.5 
Average  salary  $51,835  $33,156 $66,700 $70,069 $54,702 
%  male  80%  19% *  83% 65% 
%  married    56%  55% 75% *  50% 
401(k)  participation  rate  80%  61% 86% 85% 83% 
Average  401(k)  balance  $80,740  $19,501 $81,122 $88,033 $60,426 
Maximum contribution rate  
(% of salary) 
10% before-tax, 14% after-
tax, 14% combined 
15% before-tax  20% before-tax  25% before-tax and after-
tax combined 
1998-99: 14% before-tax
2000: 16% before-tax 
Employer match  25% to 100% (varies by 
location) of first 6% of pay 
25% of first 3%  
of pay 
None until 2000, then  
100% of first 1% of pay, 
50% of next 4% of pay 
50% of first 7% or 8% of 
pay (depends on union 
membership) 
100% of first 3% of pay, 
50% of next 3% of pay 
Investment funds  1998: 3 bond, 3 large-cap, 
1 mid-cap, 1 small-cap, 3 
overseas, company stock. 
1999: Added 1 bond, 1 
large-cap, 1 overseas. 
2000: Added 1 overseas 
and self-directed window. 
1 cash, 1 bond, 3 pre-
mix, 2 large-cap, 1 
small-cap, 1 overseas, 
company stock 
1 cash, 3 bond, 4 pre-
mix, 8 large-cap, 5 mid-
cap, 3 small-cap, 8 
overseas, 3 sector, 
company stock 
1998: 1 cash, 1 bond, 3 
pre-mix, 1 large-cap, 1 
mid-cap, 1 overseas, 
company stock 
1999: Added 1 small cap, 
self-directed window 
1 bond, 3 pre-mix, 5 
large-cap, 1 small-cap, 1 
overseas 
Number of outstanding  
loans allowed 
1 home loan, 1 general 
purpose loan 
1 2 2 2 
Hardship  withdrawals  allowed  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Non-hardship withdrawal 
rules before age 59½ 
1 withdrawal allowed per 
month from after-tax, 
rollover, vested company 
match, and profit-share 
balances  
After-tax and vested 
employer contribution 
money from 
grandfathered plans can 
be withdrawn at any time
Not allowed  After-tax and vested 
employer match money 
can be withdrawn at any 
time 
After-tax and rollover 
balances can be 
withdrawn at any time 
* Data unavailableTable 2. Indices Used to Calculate Expected Returns 
 
This table presents the indices used to calculate investors’ expected return measures. All index returns 
assume that distributions are reinvested. Data are from Ibbotson Associates 
 
Asset class  Index 
Money Market  1-month Treasury Bill return 
GIC/Stable Value  1-month Treasury Bill return 
Bond  Ibbotson long-term corporate bond index 
Balanced  (mixed according to particular plan's funds) 
Lifestyle/Pre-mix (mixed  according to particular plan's funds) 
Large US Equity  S&P 500 
Mid US Equity  NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks in NYSE market cap deciles 3 to 5 
Small US Equity  Ibbotson small stock index 
International  MSCI AC World except U.S. (starting with Jan. 1988 index inception)
S&P 500 (before January 1988) 
Emerging Markets  MSCI Emerging Markets (starting with Jan. 1988 index inception) 
S&P 500 (before January 1988) 
Employer Stock  Employer stock (for adaptive expected returns) 
S&P 500 (for constant expected return) 
 Table 3. Consumption Growth and Normalized Wealth Shock Distributions 
 
This table presents summary statistics on consumption growth and the two wealth shock measures. 
Consumption growth is defined as the year-over-year change in real consumption during the last pay 
cycle of December, normalized by real income in the last pay cycle of the prior year (see equation (3)). 
The normalized adaptive wealth shock is the difference between the real capital gain actually realized 
by the participant during the year and what he would have realized had the real returns on his funds 
equaled the ten-year lagged average real returns of the funds’ respective asset classes (Table 2), 
normalized by prior-year real annual income. The normalized constant return wealth shock is the 
difference between the real capital gain actually realized by the participant during the year and what he 
would have realized had the real returns on his funds equaled the average real returns of the funds’ 
respective asset classes from 1926 to 1997, normalized by prior-year real annual income. The 
distributions shown are for yearly consumption growth from year-end 1998 through year-end 2000, 







return wealth shock 
Maximum 0.4251  7.5043  7.9207 
99
th percentile  0.2463  1.2734  1.4029 
90
th percentile  0.1362  0.2272  0.2591 
75
th percentile  0.0704  0.0397  0.0547 
50
th percentile  0.0136  -0.0082  0.0002 
25
th percentile  -0.0133  -0.1426  -0.1073 
10
th percentile  -0.0449  -0.3942  -0.3191 
1
st percentile  -0.1447  -1.3260  -1.1380 
Minimum -0.2801  -8.9672  -8.7353 
      
Mean 0.0310  -0.0460  -0.0075 
Std. Dev.  0.0760  0.4238  0.4146 
Serial correlation  0.1027  -0.4232  -0.3672 
 Table 4. Regression of Consumption Growth on Normalized Wealth Shock 
 
The dependent variable is the year-over-year change in real consumption in the last pay cycle of 
December, normalized by real salary in the last pay cycle of the prior year. Coefficients are shown for 
two estimators: a least squares estimator and the Honoré (1992) estimator. Shockt is defined in two 
ways. The normalized adaptive wealth shock is the difference between the real capital gain actually 
realized by the participant during the year and what he would have realized had the real returns on his 
funds equaled the ten-year lagged average real returns of the funds’ respective asset classes (Table 2). 
The constant return wealth shock is the difference between the real capital gain actually realized by the 
participant during the year and what he would have realized had the real returns on his funds equaled 
the average real returns of the funds’ respective asset classes from 1926 to 1997. Yt–1 is inflation-
adjusted salary paid in year t – 1. Aget–1 is the participant’s age at the end of t – 1. Tenuret–1 is the 
number of years since original hire at the end of t – 1. Coefficients for company-year dummies are 
omitted. Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
Adaptive wealth shock  Constant return wealth shock   
Least squares  Honoré  Least squares   Honoré 
-0.0179** -0.0050** -0.0174** -0.0044**  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
-0.0210** -0.0070** -0.0183** -0.0055**  Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0020) 
-0.1911** -0.0802*  -0.1897** -0.0883**  Age
2
t–1/1000 
(0.0371) (0.0313) (0.0371) (0.0318) 
-0.0203** -0.0093*  -0.0209** -0.0094  Log(Tenuret–1) 
(0.0068) (0.0044) (0.0068) (0.0050) 
Company-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  54,054 54,054 54,054 54,054 
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the1% level Table 5. Regression of Consumption Growth 
on Normalized Wealth Shock Interacted with Age 
 
The dependent variable is the year-over-year change in real consumption in the last pay cycle of 
December, normalized by real salary in the last pay cycle of the prior year. Coefficients are shown for 
two estimators: a least squares estimator and the Honoré (1992) estimator. Shockt is defined in two 
ways. The normalized adaptive wealth shock is the difference between the real capital gain actually 
realized by the participant during the year and what he would have realized had the real returns on his 
funds equaled the ten-year lagged average real returns of the funds’ respective asset classes (Table 2). 
The constant return wealth shock is the difference between the real capital gain actually realized by the 
participant during the year and what he would have realized had the real returns on his funds equaled 
the average real returns of the funds’ respective asset classes from 1926 to 1997. The dummy variables 
(n1 ≤ Age < n2) are equal to 1 if age at year-end 1998 falls in the specified range. Yt–1 is inflation-
adjusted salary paid in year t – 1. Coefficients for age, age-squared, log of tenure, log of salary, and 
company-year dummies are omitted. Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
Adaptive wealth shock  Constant return wealth shock   
Least squares Honoré  Least squares  Honoré 
-0.0949** -0.0862** -0.0926** -0.0846**  Shockt × (Age < 30) /Yt–1 
(0.0169) (0.0220) (0.0180) (0.0234) 
-0.0368** -0.0241** -0.0350** -0.0239**  Shockt × (30 ≤ Age < 40) /Yt–1 
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) 
-0.0184** -0.0040  -0.0179** -0.0044  Shockt × (40 ≤ Age < 50) /Yt–1 
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0024) 
-0.0105** -0.0007  -0.0102** -0.0010  Shockt × (50 ≤ Age < 60) /Yt–1 
(0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0025) 
-0.0050 -0.0038 -0.0045 -0.0038  Shockt × (Age ≥ 60) /Yt–1 
(0.0112) (0.0195) (0.0121) (0.0234) 
-0.1177** -0.1214** -0.1009** -0.1048*  Shockt–1 × (Age < 30) /Yt–1 
(0.0350) (0.0461) (0.0336) (0.0439) 
-0.0390** -0.0393** -0.0320** -0.0329**  Shockt–1 × (30 ≤ Age < 40) /Yt–1 
(0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0082) 
-0.0197** -0.0055  -0.0173** -0.0054  Shockt–1 × (40 ≤ Age < 50) /Yt–1 
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0035) 
-0.0131* -0.0006  -0.0115* -0.0012  Shockt–1 × (50 ≤ Age < 60) /Yt–1 
(0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0037) 
-0.0044 -0.0063 -0.0029 -0.0043  Shockt–1 × (Age ≥ 60) /Yt–1 
(0.0174) (0.0388) (0.0169) (0.0395) 
Company-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  54,054 54,054 54,054 54,054 
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level Table 6. Probit Regression of Older Workers Leaving the Company  
on Normalized Wealth Shock  
 
The dependent variable equals 1 if the participant has left the company during 2000, and 0 otherwise. 
Individuals included in these regressions were active participants in their company’s 401(k) plan for all 
of calendar years 1998 and 1999 and were at least 60 years old and not yet retired at year-end 1999. 
Shockt is defined in two ways. The normalized adaptive wealth shock is the difference between the real 
capital gain actually realized by the participant during year t and what he would have realized had the 
real returns on his funds equaled the ten-year lagged average real returns of the funds’ respective asset 
classes (Table 2). The constant return wealth shock is the difference between the real capital gain 
actually realized by the participant during the year and what he would have realized had the real 
returns on his funds equaled the average real returns of the funds’ respective asset classes from 1926 to 
1997. Y1999 is inflation-adjusted salary paid in 1999. Age1999 is the participant’s age at the end of 1999. 
Tenure1999 is the number of years since original hire at the end of 1999. Estimates for company 
dummies are omitted. The columns labeled “Coefficient” present coefficient estimates from the probit. 
The columns labeled “Slope” present marginal effects evaluated at the means of the explanatory 
variables. Standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
  Adaptive wealth shock  Constant return wealth shock 
  Coefficient  Slope  Coefficient  Slope 
0.0672 0.0268 0.0562  0.0224  Shock1999/Y1999 
(0.0905) (0.0361) (0.0864)  (0.0345) 
0.2910 0.1160 0.3006  0.1199  Shock1998/Y1999 
(0.2470) (0.0985) (0.2016)  (0.0804) 
0.0129 0.0051 0.0126  0.0050  Age1999 
(0.0141) (0.0056) (0.0141)  (0.0056) 
-0.3317** -0.1323** -0.3382*  -0.1349*  Log(Y1999) 
(0.1210) (0.0483) (0.1215)  (0.0485) 
Log(Tenure1999)  0.1510* 0.0602* 0.1466*  0.0585* 
  (0.0667) (0.0267) (0.0669)  (0.0267) 
Company dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1,457 1,457 
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level Table 7.  Robustness Checks 
This table presents variants of the regressions in Table 4. The aspect of the specification that has been 
modified is given in the first column. Coefficients for age, age-squared, log of tenure, log of salary, 
company-year dummies, and state-year dummies (where applicable) are omitted. Standard errors are in 
parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
Adaptive wealth shock  Constant return wealth shock   
Specification 
 
Variable  Least squares  Honoré  Least squares  Honoré 
-0.0027** 0.0000 -0.0029** 0.0000  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0007) (0.0009)  (0.0007) (0.0009) 
-0.0023 0.0000  -0.0024*  0.0000 
Dependent variable is 
negative of change in 
401(k) contribution rate  Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0013) (0.0012)  (0.0012) (0.0011) 
-0.0195** -0.0028  -0.0189** -0.0030  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0057) (0.0068)  (0.0059) (0.0073) 
-0.0068 -0.0001  -0.0044 -0.0002 
Sample restricted to 
participants interior to 
match threshold  Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0102) (0.0108)  (0.0100) (0.0103) 
-0.0178** -0.0038**  -0.0174** -0.0044**  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0019) (0.0012)  (0.0020) (0.0013) 
-0.0211** -0.0053**  -0.0187** -0.0054** 
Sample restricted to 
participants who remain 
in the same zip code  Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0033) (0.0019)  (0.0032) (0.0018) 
-0.0228** -0.0134**  -0.0223** -0.0131**  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0035) (0.0032)  (0.0037) (0.0034) 
-0.0252** -0.0177**  -0.0223** -0.0152** 
Sample restricted to 
unmarried participants 
Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0066) (0.0032)  (0.0064) (0.0047) 
-0.0187** -0.0052**  -0.0180** -0.0052**  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0021) (0.0014)  (0.0021) (0.0014) 
-0.0230** -0.0071**  -0.0197** -0.0062** 
Assume immediate 
consumption of in-
service withdrawals  Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0037) (0.0022)  (0.0036) (0.0021) 
-0.0145** -0.0042**  -0.0140** -0.0040**  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0017) (0.0010)  (0.0018) (0.0011) 
-0.0164** -0.0057**  -0.0141** -0.0049** 
Assume in-service 
withdrawals are 
annuitized  Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0031) (0.0017)  (0.0030) (0.0016) 
-0.0153** -0.0036**  -0.0146** -0.0036**  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0018) (0.0013)  (0.0019) (0.0014) 
-0.0166** -0.0046*  -0.0141** -0.0041* 
Include state × year 
effects 
Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0033) (0.0021)  (0.0031) (0.0019) 
-0.0196** -0.0076**  -0.0188** -0.0067*  Shockt/Yt–1 
(0.0033) (0.0025)  (0.0034) (0.0026) 
-0.0210** -0.0124**  -0.0179** -0.0087* 
Sample restricted to 
those in the lowest third 
of the home ownership 
distribution 
Shockt–1/Yt–1 
(0.0058) (0.0041)  (0.0056) (0.0038) 
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level 
 